


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15 November 1963



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SPECIAL REPORT

THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI IMPASSE OVER CONTROL OF KASHMIR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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15 November 1963

THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI IMPASSE OVER CONTROL OF KASHMIR

The Kashmir dispute remains one of the bitterest legacies of the partition of British-ruled India in 1947. After fifteen years, neither Pakistan nor India is any more willing to accept a solution which would leave the other country in control of the central Vale of Kashmir, regardless of other inducements to compromise. Pakistan's frustration over its inability to wrest the Vale from India is still the basic emotion pervading its entire foreign policy. India's policy too, even though given expression in appealingly statesmanlike utterances, rests as far as Kashmir is concerned on a foundation composed of a mixture of intense patriotic and communal sentiment. While each side adopts legal arguments derived from the events of 1947, when India took over the Vale, the roots of the dispute go far back into the past.

Historical Background

Kashmir is a rugged land, lying across the western invasion route from Tibet and Sinkiang into the Indian subcontinent. The heart of the country is a beautiful valley, 85 miles long by 25 miles wide and a mile above sea level. This is the Vale of Kashmir, surrounded by inhospitable mountains which include, on the north, the Karakoram, the world's highest range. Outside the Vale, the population is sparse and poverty-ridden, and the docile people of the main valley have long feared the more warlike tribes from the neighboring hills. Although this whole region is in dispute, it is the Vale that is the heart of the matter.

In the 14th century, Moslem invaders converted the Kashmiris to Islam, and the area was an-


nexed to the Moslem Moghul Empire by the Emperor Akbar in 1587. The re-establishment of Hindu control is a relatively modern development; the British turned Kashmir over to the Hindu ruler of Jammu, which lies just to the south, creating the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846. During the rest of the 19th century the Hindus took revenge for 500 years of Moslem rule, and the Moslems felt themselves cruelly oppressed. More direct British control over the state gave the Moslems somewhat greater freedom to resist the Hindu ruler's regime, and agitation gradually increased during the period before World War II.

Circumstances of Partition

When the British gave India and Pakistan their independence in August 1947 and the subcontinent

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
"Kashmir is a garden of eternal spring, or an iron fort to a palace of kings--- a delightful flower-bed, and a heart-expanding heritage for dervishes. Its pleasant meads and enchanting cascades are beyond all description."

--Jehangir, Moghul Emperor

was partitioned, the status of Kashmir, like that of a number of other areas, was still undecided. Under the terms of the partition operation, the Hindu maharaja of Kashmir had the right to opt for either Pakistan or India. When he delayed, many of his Moslem subjects--who then comprised an estimated 93 percent of the population--agitated for accession to Pakistan. By October, the maharaja was faced with a revolt, and, as the revolt spread, Pushtoon tribesmen from Pakistan's Northwest Fron-

tier region invaded Kashmir with Pakistani encouragement.

Unable to cope with the situation himself, the maharaja opted for India, and New Delhi immediately sent troops who drove back the tribesmen and suppressed the local Moslem agitation. India's claim to the state thus has a technically strong legal foundation in the maharaja's act of accession. The Pakistani advocates point out, however, that the basic



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concept of partition was that Pakistan was to comprise the contiguous Moslem-majority areas of British India. They insist that Kashmir is such an area, that the Kashmiri people without question would have preferred to join Pakistan, and that they were prevented from doing so only by Hindu troops, first those of the maharaja and then those sent by New Delhi.

Subsequent mediation efforts and negotiations have not moved the parties from these positions, nor from the territory that the respective forces occupied. In 1948 and 1949, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan secured the agreement of both parties to a cease-fire, demilitarization, and a plebiscite. With minor interruptions, the cease-fire has remained in effect. The demilitarization agreement, however, was never carried out, and in 1956 India announced that it therefore no longer held itself bound to conduct a plebiscite.

At that time, India gave Pakistani membership in Western military pacts as its main reason for this stand. Last summer, it gave improved Pakistani relations with Communist China as a reason for not negotiating. In each case the real reason is India's determination to hold the Vale.

Kashmir Today

Since the cease-fire, each side has organized its Kashmir territory along quite different lines. Although Pakistan has done less administratively and materially, its regime probably enjoys more popular acceptance than the government in Indian-held Kashmir.

Pakistan controls several mountain districts comprising about one third of the total area of Jammu and Kashmir. The districts to the north had relatively tenuous ties with the old princely state and are administered as special political agencies under the Central Pakistani Government at Rawalpindi. The districts lying along the western edge of the Vale make up what is known as Azad ("Free") Kashmir, supposedly a separate, provisional government pending the settlement of the dispute, but actually under the control of Rawalpindi. It enjoys purely local autonomy, even though President Khurshid talks pretentiously about the possibility of receiving military aid directly from Communist China.

In its internal structure, Azad Kashmir has its own version of Pakistani President Ayub's Basic Democracies program,

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Present Population (Approximate)	Total	Percent Moslem
Azad	1,000,000	100
Vale of Kashmir	2,000,000	90
Entire Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir	3,500,000	70

plus the usual official political pressures and election irregularities. Opposition forces nonetheless have enjoyed enough freedom to seriously challenge Khurshid in elections two years ago. The most popular political appeal among the Azad Kashmiris is to demand or promise to revive the Kashmir liberation movement and march on the cease-fire line.

Pakistan has not attempted to make Azad Kashmir a showplace; the local administration is supported mainly by local taxation, and Pakistan's financial contribution seems to be limited to a few million dollars for agricultural extension services and food subsidies. Economic development consequently is negligible.

India's portion of Kashmir, on the other hand, includes the famous Vale and the capital city of Srinagar, by all odds the most desirable part of the state and the traditional center of power where the "true" Kashmiri lives. The Nehru government over the years has been gradually integrating the Vale into the Indian Union.

As part of this integration, New Delhi is furnishing over \$44 million in various forms--an amount equal to about 60 percent of the state government's planned revenues for 1963-64. This help, plus resources notably superior to those of Azad Kashmir, has enabled the Srinagar administration to support a relatively impressive program of economic development, including infrastructure and light industry projects. Per capita expenditures in the ordinary and capital development budgets of the state are in fact twice the average for the rest of India.

Relative prosperity and India's economic support may have reduced the Kashmiri Moslems' hostility toward New Delhi's control, but most Kashmiris probably would still prefer to be free of Indian authority. The Indian Government evidently senses that this is



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the situation, since it keeps in jail Nehru's old friend, Sheik Abdullah. This "Lion of Kashmir" has been in prison for ten years because he advocates independence for the Vale, and New Delhi apparently feels that he would quickly rebuild his following and challenge its authority if he were released.

The local Moslem leadership thus remains essentially a veneer for Indian authority. Former Prime Minister Ghulam Mohammed Baakshi, the new incumbent K. Shamsuddin, and their associates all have a personal economic stake in the preservation of the status quo, and thus are genuinely pro-Indian, but they would not long remain in power if Indian troops were withdrawn.

Indian Attitudes

Although India, like Pakistan, claims the whole of the old Jammu and Kashmir state, in fact it is fairly well satisfied with the present situation, and is ready to "settle" if Pakistan would accept only minor adjustments of the cease-fire line. Any proposal or development that seems to threaten Indian control of the Vale, however, meets adamant opposition from the New Delhi government generally and from Nehru in particular.

It has often been suggested that Nehru is personally committed to Kashmir because of his family background. While it is true that his family is of Kashmiri Brahman origin, having left there in the 18th century, and that he is particularly fond of vacationing in the Vale, a more significant factor seems to be his strong commitment to the concept that Indian government and politics cannot be based on communal--i.e., religious--considerations.

To admit that Indian-held Kashmir should now, fifteen years after partition and the communal strife that accompanied it, be removed from Indian control because its population is overwhelmingly Moslem would undercut the whole secular, anticomunal philosophy of the Indian Government which Nehru's statements symbolize and support. Such an admission, moreover, would tend to make illogical the government's and Nehru's running battle against the signs of life that communalism continues to show in India--agitation for new linguistic states, for example.

At the same time that Nehru cannot admit the force of an argument based on communalism, he cannot ignore the strength of communal anti-Moslem sentiment among the Indian Hindu voters. In contrast to Nehru's

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
SHEIKH ABDULLAH

ideals and to his sense of tragedy over the partition of 1947, the average Hindu probably relishes the Moslem's outrage over Kashmir. And the Pakistani Moslem knows the Indian Hindu's attitude.

The additional challenge from Communist China in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir has, if anything, further hardened New Delhi's determination to hold Kashmir. Overland supply routes to the Ladakh front pass through the Vale. But beyond any strategic implications, India's frustration over its inability to repel the Chinese "aggressors"--strongly reminiscent of Pakistani feelings toward India--makes the Indian leaders all the more stubborn in resisting proposals that might dilute their authority in Kashmir.

Pakistani Attitudes

While the Kashmir dispute is only one of India's foreign policy problems--and by no means the one that occupies the largest share of attention in New Delhi--Kashmir often seems to come close to being the very *raison d'etre* for Pakistan's foreign policy. Every Pakistani leader has known that he could assure his place in national history if he could somehow bring Kashmir under Pakistani control. This is especially true of President Ayub, who has already promulgated a new constitution and would like to rival the late Mohammed Ali Jinnah as the "father" of the country. Unable to take steps which seemed to be leading toward a success on Kashmir, Ayub has made political capital out of denouncing



Nehru relaxes with grandchildren in Kashmir

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the West for undercutting Pakistan's interests.

This situation springs from the fact that, whatever arguments Rawalpindi may bring forward, Kashmir is simply a blight on Pakistan's national honor and a perpetual reminder that the Pakistani Moslem, whose heritage includes the glory of the Moghul Empire, is now a citizen of a country that is weaker, poorer, less skilled, and generally inferior to its "Hindu" counterpart. The Pakistani, with something of a warrior tradition behind him, is further infuriated over his relative impotence in the face of India's military superiority.

Proposals aimed at saving face for Pakistan--but leaving India in control of the Vale--therefore have not had much appeal in Rawalpindi, since possession of the Vale is the essence of the question.

Faced with these frustrations and seemingly insurmountable difficulties, Pakistani leaders have cast about for new means of exerting leverage on New Delhi. In 1959, Ayub first tried to capitalize on the Sino-Indian border difficulties by proposing a joint Indian-Pakistani defense of the subcontinent--obviously predicated on a Kashmir settlement. Nehru received this coolly.

Another strategy apparently was then developed: to wait until Chinese pressure on the Indian border would oblige India

to secure its flank with Pakistan by offering real concessions in Kashmir. The Pakistanis evidently feel, however, that this maneuver has been upset by Pakistan's Western allies, who brought military assistance to India following the Chinese invasion in the fall of 1962 and thereby, in the Pakistani view, freed India from the necessity of entering serious negotiations. Although the Pakistanis in their diplomatic statements have emphasized their fears that India might use new Western equipment to attack them, it is more probable that disappointment over this lost opportunity is what really lies behind their complaints.

Most recently, Pakistan's worry that time is on the side of India in Kashmir has been sharpened by announcements from Srinagar that further steps are



Nehru and Ayub



Indian Troops in Kashmir, 1947



Terrain Near Cease-Fire Line



Sentry on Pakistani Side of Cease-Fire Line

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being taken to tighten the constitutional bonds between Kashmir and India. In the face of this development and the failure of their other strategies, Pakistani military leaders may again be giving some consideration to limited paramilitary action as a means of generating international pressure for a settlement. Incidents at two points on the cease-fire line in late October appear to reflect Pakistan's promotion of new tensions there. At the same time, however, the Pakistanis would probably want to avoid any broad military confrontation, in which India would enjoy a heavy superiority.

The Military Situation

The cease-fire line lies mainly in the mountain districts skirting the western and northern edges of the Vale. On both the Indian and Pakistani sides outposts are placed roughly 500 yards back from the line. On the Indian side these are manned by regular Indian Army units, while on the Pakistani side they are manned by locally recruited Azad Kashmiris, who serve under regular Pakistani Army officers.

The Indian units apparently have a running fight with Kashmiris from their own side who do not understand the prohibition against grazing in the no-man's land. Attitudes apparently are more relaxed toward the local citizenry on the Pakistani side, and in some areas the Azad forces allow peasants to graze their livestock right up to the line.

Firing exchanges are not unusual, but they are ordinarily small-scale. Company-size or larger border clashes are more serious politically and less frequent in Kashmir than they are on the East Pakistan border with India, because the importance of the issue and the depth of emotion in Kashmir are so much greater that each side has been wary of a real incident there. A United Nations military observer group has been on the scene since 1949 to help prevent such clashes.

Of the forces deployed near the cease-fire line, Pakistan's are much the weaker. There is one Pakistan Army brigade, numbering some 3,000 men, and 18 Azad Kashmir battalions, comprising 22,000 men, for a total of 25,000, all under the command of Pakistan's 12th Division.

Across the line, the Indian Army has three divisions, totaling about 45,000 men, deployed against Pakistani-held Kashmir. Even during the height of the Chinese advance in the fall of 1962, the Indians maintained this deterrent force at about 40,000 men, drawing on other areas for reinforcement. This force has since been restored to about 45,000.

The Indian units have a strong advantage in quality as well as in numbers. The Azad troops, which make up the bulk of the Pakistani forces, have good esprit but are poorly

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trained and are not comparable to the regular army forces, on either side. The Pakistani Army brigade is probably about equal in quality to the Indian troops, although it does not receive modern equipment under the US military assistance program.

Outlook

Intermittent attempts since 1947 to reach a settlement, or even to put Pakistani and Indian leaders on the road toward one, have proven consistently futile. Pakistan's own ploys to exact concessions from India have been rebuffed by New Delhi or countered by circumstances beyond the Pakistanis' control. [redacted]

"Like some supremely beautiful woman, whose beauty is almost impersonal and above human desire, such was Kashmir in all its feminine beauty of river and valley and lake and graceful trees." 25X1

-- Jawaharlal Nehru

[redacted] lead-
ers in neither capital are very optimistic that new diplomatic moves will lead them out of the present impasse--an impasse, moreover, which India gives every sign of believing is 25X1
about the most satisfactory situation it can reasonably expect [redacted]

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